

S E C R E T
AGENT DATA SHEET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

ROOF PROJECT NAME _____

CRYPTONYM GRCAMERA/1

Date of this Form 25 September 1970 3 Aug 73

FILE NO. []

True Name :Dr. Otto SCHULMEISTER

201 # : []

DPOB :1 April 1916 Vienna

HQ/CO : []

Occupation:Editor in Chief, Die Presse

FLD/BASE: []

Residence :Vienna

FLD/CO : []

CIT: Austrian

ALT/CO : []

DATE OF POA : _____

DATE PROJ RENEWAL : _____

DATE OF OA : _____

APPROX AGENT SALARY:None except occa-

ADDP APPROVAL: _____

APPROX PROJECT COST:sional luncheons

PURPOSE OF OP: _____

and Christmas gift

GRCAMERA/1 is used as a direct channel for planting CIA inspired stories or editorials in his paper and for suppressing stories inimical to U.S. interests.

ORIGIN & DEVELOPMENT: Current Operational Contacts: [] has been in occasional contact with GRCAMERA/1 since November 1969. It is necessary to make appointments three or more weeks in advance because of GRCAMERA/1's busy schedule. GRCAMERA/1 can provide information on the personalities and beneath-the-surface aspects of the local scene because he has many connections and knows prominent people in his position as Editor in Chief of Die Presse. [] plans to step up the frequency of the meetings. The overt relationship is known to a number of State officials and several of GRCAMERA/1's colleagues.

ORIGIN: The Station has been in contact with GRCAMERA/1 since early 1962, when [] under [] cover, met him through Frau Ilse LEITENBERGER, a former student of one of [] Hamburg contacts, [] GRCAMERA/1 was introduced to Station contact [] by [] circa June 1965 before [] returned PCS to Headquarters. [] has also met GRCAMERA/1. (CONT'D)

FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:

Three times between November 1969 and May 1970 for lunch at a local restaurant.

OPERATIONAL COMMO:

Secure commo is not necessary since an overt relationship exists.

DAMAGE POTENTIAL (Operational and/or Political): GRCAMERA/1 first met [] as a member of State; however, as a result of insinuations made to LEITENBERGER by [], GRCAMERA/1 believed [] to have intelligence duties. [] assumed that [] (a witting collaborator) indicated or implied to LEITENBERGER what [] previous position was

HQ/CO EVALUATION OF AGENT PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL: (CONT'D)

A. HIGH

B. AVERAGE

C. MARGINAL

PERTINENT SUPPORTING COMMENTS:

ORIGIN: (CONT'D)

GRCAMERA/1 has been the Station's principal D&TO contact; his major CA work on our behalf in the past has been surfacing Soviet activities in Austria. There are no contractual commitments with GRCAMERA/1 but he is described as a witting collaborator whose convictions follow a completely pro-U.S. editorial policy: both he and his principal writers spontaneously support U.S. positions. His ability to accept guidances is limited by the nature of his publication (independent and somewhat conservative) and by the responsible position which it enjoys locally. It is usually not possible to place spot CA items with him.

DAMAGE POTENTIAL: (CONT'D)

in Hamburg and assuming that he still had intelligence duties, passed this information along to GRCAMERA/1. GRCAMERA/1 subsequently mentioned to [] that he had met with the "chief of intelligence" in GRBANAL.